Feb 25, 2008

China’s Role in African Infrastructure Development

by Tim Ogden

A recent Wall Street Journal article pointed to the marked contrast between the current US and Chinese approaches to aid in Africa. China’s role in sub-Saharan Africa has drawn increasing scrutiny, from its support for the Sudanese government, to Chinese companies’ aggressive pursuit of natural resources, to the government’s aid and loan programs.

The article highlighted the fact that Chinese aid to Africa currently takes the form of loans to fund the building of infrastructure—roads, government buildings, stadiums and the like. Meanwhile Western donors generally focus on health, education and good governance. Yet the article fails to identify the important reasons for the differences in approach: While “fashion” in aid plays a role, Western donors have largely moved away from infrastructure projects because of the way in which they have been historically mired in deep corruption; and Western-funded buildings and roads have rarely been maintained once they’ve been built.

Also missing is a discussion of some of the more troubling aspects of China’s aid from a development perspective, which I spoke about with Jennifer Cooke, co-director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “China’s infrastructure programs in Africa typically involve using Chinese materials, Chinese firms and even Chinese labor,” notes Cooke. This obviously has a significant influence on the long-term impact of these aid projects. “Ultimately China is doing these deals because they serve Chinese interests—access to natural resources and access to markets. That’s perfectly natural. But many African countries don’t have the capacity or the experience to drive a harder bargain with the Chinese.” Dissatisfaction with the role of Chinese workers in Zambia became a major factor in that country’s recent elections.

Playing into these deals is the need for infrastructure investment, particularly in countries that have experienced recent conflict. Cooke cites Angola as an example: “The Angolan government decided that getting these projects done was more important [than the terms of the deal]. The priority is to rebuild and rebuild fast. As that sense of urgency subsides, the Angolans may well push harder on employment quotas, local contractors, etc.”

There is a difficult line to be drawn here. Given the situation in Angola, striking a deal with the Chinese was quite possibly the right decision. Western aid, and criticism of China’s role in Africa, has often been far too paternalistic—dictating to African countries what they need and how to pursue “their” goals. African countries are free to take needed investment from whoever provides it. And no one can make a credible argument that Western aid isn’t driven by self-interest—a very large portion of Western aid is spent on Western consultants or buying Western products. There is, however, reason to be concerned in the lack of transparency of many of China’s infrastructure projects in Africa. “The deals that are struck are often just with the executive branch of a government, often a very narrow swath of the executive. There’s not a lot of transparency on how deals get cut and what the quid pro quo is,” says Cooke.

There is reason to be concerned then, that the deals being struck by China are not only not symbiotic with Western aid, as the article claims, but may ultimately be undermining Western philanthropy’s investment in good governance and human development.